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Currin: Florida's Homestead Exemption: Does This Chameleon Ever Die?

COMMENT
FLORIDA'S HOMESTEAD EXEMpInON: DOES THIs
CHAMELEON EVER DIE?

Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997)
Peter Currin*
Petitioner was the granddaughter of testatrix who died without a
surviving spouse but with a surviving adult child.' In her will, the testatrix
devised her homestead to the Petitioner. Petitioner sought a determination
that, as an heir of the testatrix, the homestead exemption provided by the
Florida Constitution3 should inure to her benefit and allow the homestead
to pass free from creditor claims. ' Respondent, personal representative of
the estate, argued that the petitioner was not an "heir" as defined by the
Florida intestacy statutes5 because the testatrix had a living adult son' who
represented the sole heir.' The trial court determined that the petitioner did
belong to the class of persons designated to be heirs by the intestacy
statutes, and granted her petition.' The Florida Second District Court of
Appeal reversed,9 but certified a question to the Supreme Court of Florida
to determine whether the homestead exemption provided by article X,
section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution inures to the benefit of a lineal
descendant of the decedent, who is not the decedent's true heir."0 The
* To my wife, Lynn, and my son, Kelly, whose love and sacrifices made my law school
experience possible. I also thank Professor D.T. Smith, who provided the inspiration for this
comment, and Professor Richard Pearson, who introduced me to Torts but taught me much, much
more.
1. See Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1997).
2. See id.
3. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) ("There shall be exempt from forced sale... and no

judgment... shall be a lien upon... the following property owned by a natural person: (1) a homestead .... ).
4. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1000.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 731.201(18) (1997) (defining "heirs" as "those persons, including the
surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a
decedent"); see also FLA. STAT. § 732.103 (1997) (delineating the categories of persons who
constitute potential heirs under intestacy).
6. Florida laws of intestate succession provide that inheritance shall be "per stirpes." See
FLA. STAT. § 732.104 (1997).

7. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001.
8. See id.
9. See id.

10. The precise certified question before the court was: "Whether Article X, Section 4, of the
Florida Constitution exempts from forced sale a devise of a homestead by a decedent not survived
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Supreme Court of Florida reversed and HELD, the term "heirs" as used in
the constitutional homestead provision includes devisees, and encompasses
any family members in the class of persons categorized in the Florida
intestacy statutes."
The constitutional provision protecting homestead property from forced
sale by a decedent's creditors' 2 first appeared in article IX of the Florida
Constitution of 1868."3 The provision has been modified and amended
several times since its introduction, and is now located in article X, section
4(b). 4 The homestead exemption and the difficulty associated with its
many applications have been the subject of numerous commentaries
throughout the years. 5 The extent to which the homestead exemption
should inure to protect a devisee taking property by will is merely the latest
homestead exemption puzzle facing practitioners in Florida.
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved much confusion surrounding6
the homestead exemption when it decided PublicHealth Trust v. Lopez
in 1988. In Lopez, the decedent left her homestead to her three adult
by a spouse or minor child to a lineal descendant who is not an heir under the definition in section
731.201(18), Florida Statutes (1993)?" Snyder v. Davis, 681 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Fla. 2d DCA
1996). The instant court divided the question into two issues: first, whether devisees are entitled
to the homestead exemption protection even though the property has not passed via intestacy, and
if so, how to define the class of devisees entitled to the exemption's protection. See Snyder, 699 So.
2d at 1002-04.
11. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1005.
12. The Supreme Court of Florida has noted that homestead property loses its character as
homestead as soon as the property owner dies, unless the recipient of the property qualifies for their
own homestead exemption. See Wilson v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 64 So. 2d 309,313 (Fla.
1953). In other words, art. X, § 4(b) does not technically extend the property's homestead status.
It is the exemption's protection against forced sale by creditors of the decedent that will survive
when the requirements of art. X, § 4(b) are satisfied. Of course, determining precisely when these
requirements are satisfied is the subject of this Case Comment. It is also pointed out that an heir
taking homestead property under intestacy, or a devisee of homestead property, who qualifies for
homestead exemption status on his own is only protected from forced sale by his own creditors, and
not those of the decedent. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a). That is, the inurement provision extending
the protection from the decedent's creditors and the exemption status of the new owner operate
independently from one another. Compare FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) with FLA. CONST. art. X, §
4(b).
13. See Harold B. Crosby & George John Miller, Our Legal Chameleon: The Florida
HomesteadExemption: I-III, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 12, 14 n.10 (1949).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 12-13 (describing the homestead exemption as a "chameleon" based on its
numerous applications); see also Rohan Kelley, HomesteadMade Easy: PartI: Understandingthe
Basics,FLA. B.J., Mar. 1991, at 17 (comparing the homestead exemption to the'"midst and darkness
of Chaos"). The exemption from forced sale at issue in Snyder should not be confused with the
homestead tax exemption in art. VII, § 6(a), or with the homestead exemption in art. X, § 4(c)
which limits the ability of a homeowner to devise his/her property when survived by a spouse
and/or a minor child.
16. 531 So. 2d 946, 951 (Fla. 1988).
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children, who lived with the decedent at the time of her death. 7 The
decedent's personal representative petitioned the court to grant the property
the protection of the homestead exemption.18 A creditor of the estate
opposed the petition, arguing that the longstanding public policy
justifications for the constitutional exemption did not support its use to
protect nondependent children from the creditors of the estate. 9 The trial
court granted the creditor's motion, but the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal reversed, ruling that an heir's dependence on the decedent has no
impact on whether the homestead exemption should inure to the benefit of
the decedent's heirs.2"
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the opinion of the appellate
court,"' based on public policy and the underlying purpose of the
homestead exemption, which is to provide a broad protection to
homeowners and their heirs.' The Court also referenced the 1984
amendment to the homestead exemption provision, which relaxed the
exemption's eligibility requirements from "head of a family" to "a natural
person, '2 3 showing a trend toward expanding rather than limiting the
exemption.24 Finally, the Court applied traditional rules of statutory
construction to the constitutional provision, and concluded that the
language providing that benefits would "inure to the surviving spouse or
heirs of the owner" was clear and unambiguous, precluding any judicial
attempt to incorporate a dependency requirement into the provision.'
17. See id. at 947. The court in Lopez was silent regarding whether the homestead property
was passing under a will or via intestacy. However, the Third District Court of Appeal noted in a
later case that the property had passed by will. See Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282, 284 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1991).
18. See Lopez, 531 So. 2d at 947.
19. See id. at 947-48. The creditor/petitioner in Lopez argued that the underlyingjustification
of the homestead exemption was to protect homeowners and members of a homeowner's family by
shielding the homestead property from creditors. An inheriting family member who is not
dependent on the decedent and not residing in the decedent's home would not warrant this
protection. See id.
20. See id. at 947.
21. See id. at 951.
22. See id. at 948 (citing Bigelow v. Dunphe, 197 So. 328 (Fla. 1940) forthe proposition that
the purpose of the homestead exemption is to promote the welfare and stability of the State, by
ensuring that homeowners and their heirs can live beyond the reach of creditors).
23. Despite the expansion of the 1984 amendment to the exemption provision, not all
homeowners in Florida enjoy the benefits of the homestead exemption. Most importantly, art. X
requires that a property be the owner's residence in order to qualify for the exemption. See FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1). Other limitations (i.e., acreage limits) also apply. For simplicity, this
Comment employs the term "homeowner" instead of the more technically correct "homesteader,"
to reference property owners whose property does qualify for the homestead exemption in art. X.
24. See Lopez, 531 So. 2d at 948.
25. See id. at 949. "[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys
a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation
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Three years later, the Third District Court of Appeal reinforced the
durability of the homestead exemption in Bartelt v. Bartelt,"6 a case
involving homestead property devised in a decedent' s will.27 In Bartelt,the
respondent, son of the testator, was named as devisee of the testator's
homestead under the will.28 Petitioner, the personal representative of the
estate, challenged the homestead exemption by arguing the term "heirs" in
article X, section 4(b) meant the exemption could only survive when the
passed by intestacy, and not when the property passed under a
property
9
2

will.

The trial court ruled that the benefit of the exemption did inure to the
devisee and the appellate court affirmed, citing the public policy argument
outlined by the Supreme Court of Florida in Lopez, which favored a liberal
interpretation of the homestead exemption.3' The court also reasoned that
the Florida Statutes define "heirs" as those persons entitled to receive
property under the laws of intestacy, and since the devisee in that case was
a lineal descendant, he belonged to that class of persons. 3 The court
determined that the constitutional provision defines the class of persons to
whom the exemption will inure, but does not dictate the manner in which
the recipient of the property must receive title. 2
Inquiry into the proper "devisability" of the homestead exemption took
another turn in 1997, when the First District Court of Appeal decided
Walker v. Mickler.33 In Walker, the decedent's will granted a remainder
interest34 in her homestead to her grandson, although the grandson was not
the decedent's closest consanguine heir.35 Petitioner, a creditor of the
estate, sought to have the exemption voided because the grandson was not
a true "heir" of the decedent under Florida intestacy law, and because the

and construction ... ." Id. (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).
26. 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
27. See id. at 283.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 284.
30. See id. at 283-84; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. See Bartelt, 579 So. 2d at 284; see also supra note 5; infra note 70.
32. See Bartelt, 579 So. 2d at 284. The court cites Kelley, supra note 15, at 22, in support
of this proposition. See id.
33. 687 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
34. The court held that a remainder interest qualifies for the homestead exemption. See id.
at 1329 (citing Hubert v. Hubert, 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)). In Hubert,the testator's
will devised a life estate in the homestead to a nonheir, and the remainder interest to one of the
testator's sons. See Hubert, 622 So. 2d at 1049-50. A creditor of the estate challenged the use of
the homestead exemption to protect the son's nonpossessory remainder interest. See id.at 1050. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal allowed the exemption to inure to the son's benefit, based on the
public policy arguments behind the homestead exemption, and the testator's intent. See id.at 105051.
35. See Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1328-29.
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term "heirs" in the constitutional provision precluded the passing of an
exemption to a "devisee" under a will.36 The trial court ruled that the
grandson's remainder interest was entitled to protection by the homestead
exemption, and the creditor appealed.37
In upholding the trial court's ruling, the appellate court adopted the
rationale of the Third District's Bartelt decision, finding that the
homestead's passing via a will rather than intestacy was not a significant
fact for consideration.38 Addressing the more novel issue-exactly who
may constitute an "heir" for purposes of the homestead exemption
provision-the court defined heir as "those who may under the laws of the
state inherit from the owner of the homestead."39 The court also stated
broadly that the 1984 amendment to article X, section 4 of the Florida
Constitution reflected an "intent that the exemption [should] inure to
whomever the homestead property passes.'"4 The court continued its
analysis by citing the holding and public policy arguments from Lopez to
support its liberal application of the exemption.' In conclusion, the district
court acknowledged the conflict between its ruling and that of the Second
District in Snyder v. Davis.42 The Second District certified conflict with
Snyder, and the Supreme Court of Florida subsequently granted review to
resolve the conflict.43
The Supreme Court of Florida, in the instant case, concluded that the
use of the term "heirs" (and not "devisees") within article X, section 4(b)
does not preclude application of that provision in testate situations.' The
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1329; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1329 (quoting State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Trammell, 508 So. 2d 422,423 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (quoting Shone v. Bellmore, 78 So. 605, 607
(Fla. 1918))).
40. See id.at 1330.
41. See id. at 1330-31; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
42. See Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1330-31; see also supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
43. See Walker v. Mickler, 687 So. 2d 1328 (1st DCA), rev. granted,696 So. 2d 343 (Fla.
1997). The Florida Supreme Court in Snyderapproved the First District Court ofAppeal's decision
in Walker, and quashed the Second District Court ofAppeal's Snyderdecision. See Snyder,699 So.
2d at 1005-06.
44. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1003. The court acknowledged that the threshold question of
whether the homestead exemption could inure to the benefit of devisees was one offirst impression.
See id. at 1002. As the Third District Court of Appeal pointed out in Bartelt, the Supreme Court
of Florida had already upheld the inurement of the exemption in a testate situation in Lopez,
although the lower court opinion in Lopez was unclear regarding the manner in which the property
had passed. See supra note 17. The instant court concluded that the exemption could protect
property passed under a will, citing Bartelt as persuasive authority:
When the decedent's homestead is devised to his son-a member of the class of
persons who are the decedent's "heirs"--the constitutional exemption from forced
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instant court then resolved the conflict between the alternative definitions
of "heirs" by adopting the rationale of the First District in Walker.45 The
instant court labeled the Walker approach the "class definition,"
recognizing "heirs" as any member of the class of potential heirs
categorized within section 732.103.46 The court characterized the Second
District's Snyder approach as the "entitlement definition," since it defined
"heirs" more narrowly as those who would actually be entitled to inherit
under the laws of intestacy, had the decedent died intestate.47
The instant court majority found the Walker court's reasoning
persuasive and concluded that the broader "class" definition was the more
desirable approach. 48 The court focused on the Walkerdefinition of "heirs"
as "those who may under the laws of the state inherit from the owner of the
homestead, 49 as well as the Walker court's general public policy
arguments favoring a liberal interpretation of the homestead exemption."'
The majority also incorporated its own public policy argument
regarding the potential impacts that the alternative approaches would have
on estate planning.51 Under the entitlement approach, a homeowner
wanting to devise his or her property to a specific person (even a specific
lineal descendent) could not be certain that the homestead exemption
would inure to that devisee's benefit, because the question of whether that
devisee was actually entitled to take under intestacy could not be answered
until the homeowner's death.52 Alternatively, the "class" definition would
ensure that the homestead exemption would survive, provided the property
were devised to someone within the category of potential heirs listed in
section 732.103."3 The court noted with approval that this higher degree of
54
predictability would increase the utility of wills and discourage intestacy.
The two dissenting opinions in the instant case focused instead on the

sale by the decedent's creditors found in Article X, Section 4(b) of the Florida
Constitution, inures to that son. The test is not how title was devolved, but rather

to whom it passed.
Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1003 (quoting Bartelt, 579 So. 2d at 283).
45. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1004.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. (quoting Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1329 (quoting State Dep't of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Trammell, 508 So. 2d 422, 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (quoting Shone v.
Bellmore, 78 So. 605, 607 (Fla. 1918))); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
50. See Snyder,699 So. 2d at 1004-05; see also supranotes 22 & 41 and accompanying text.
51. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1005.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Seeki.
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historical definitions of "heirs" that the court had previously adopted,55 and
a straightforward plain language construction of article X, section 4(b). 6
The majority's analysis uses case history and public policy arguments
to support its ultimate conclusion about the correct interpretation of "heirs"
in the exemption provision. 7 The majority does not, however, make any
initial attempt at a plain language construction of the provision. This
omission is curious because most authorities agree that outside evidence
should be used for interpretation purposes only when the text of the statute
or constitution is unclear or ambiguous.5 8 While the court's focus on
defining "heirs" does suggest an underlying conviction that the word is
ambiguous and in need of clarification, the absence of an explicit attempt
to construe the provision "on its face" is conspicuous.
The instant court adopted the term "class definition" based on the
Walker court's conclusion 9 that a devisee, who was a lineal descendant of
the homeowner, belonged to the class of persons entitled to inherit under
the intestacy statutes ° The Walker court was relying primarily on previous
court opinions defining "heirs" as "those who may under the laws of the
state inherit from the owner of the homestead. ' 61 However, the meaning of
this definition is less than clear. For instance, prior to a homeowner's
death, a devisee/grandson (as in Walker) would be a potential intestate heir,
and would qualify as someone who may (i.e. couldpossibly)inherit. Upon
the homeowner's death, on the other hand, the devisee/grandson would not
be an heir or even a potential heir, if another closer lineal descendant had

55. See id. at 1006 (Grimes, J., dissenting). Justice Grimes cited several Florida Supreme
Court cases supporting the proposition that "heirs" means those who would inherit under the laws
of intestacy. See id. (Grimes, J., dissenting). However, both the majority and the dissents agree that
"heirs" must be defined based on the intestacy statutes. Compare id. at 1003 with id. at 1006
(Grimes, J., dissenting). The dividing point between the two sides seen to be deciding how
literally the intestacy statutes should be applied. The majority identifies the list of potential heirs
in FLA. STAT. § 732.103 and stops there. See id. at 1003. Justice Grimes, however, states that,
according to the intestacy statutes, an individual's heirs can never be identified until that
individual's death. See id. at 1006 (Grimes, J., dissenting) ("It is well established that heirs are
determined after death, depending on who survives the testator." (citing Williams v. Williams, 6
So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1942))).
56. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1007 (Harding, J., dissenting).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
58. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946,949 (Fla. 1988); Holly v. Auld,
450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984).
59. A significant portion of the majority's opinion is taken straight from Walker. See supra
notes 49-50. For this reason much of the analysis in this Part of the Case Comment focuses directly
on the Walker court's opinion and reasoning.
60. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1329 (quoting State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Trammell, 508 So. 2d 422,423 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (quoting Shone v. Bellmore, 78 So. 2d 605,
607 (Fla. 1918))).
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survived the decedent. At that moment the devisee/grandson would clearly
be someone who may not inherit under the laws of intestacy. The meaning
of the definition upon which the Walker court relies is therefore dependent
on when the assessment of the devisee's status as an "heir" is made. 62
While the Walker court seems to conclude that the inquiry should be made
prior to rather than at the time of the homeowner's death, nothing in the
on which Walker relies clearly supports one conclusion over the
case law
3
6

other.

The instant court's use of a "class definition" also can be traced to
Bartelt,which the Walker court cited as supporting authority. 4 In Bartelt,
the Third District Court reasoned that the homestead exemption should
inure to the devisee/son because he was a member of the class of persons
who were the decedent's heirs. 65 Again, this proposition can be interpreted
two different ways.6 The Walkercourt failed to acknowledge the relevance
of the Bartelt devisee's actually being entitled to inherit (or share in
inheriting) under intestacy law.67 The Bartelt court was not forced to
choose between the "entitlement" and "class" definitions-or even
recognize the existence of two approaches-because the devisee in that
case qualified as an heir under either definition. 68 Furthermore, the
devisee/son in Bartelthad a sister who was equally entitled to inherit under
the intestacy statutes. 69 It is likely that the "class" referred to by the Bartelt
court was the class of actual heirs-the decedent's son and
daughter-rather than the class of potential heirs categorized within
section 732.103. In short, the Walker court's interpretation of Bartelt to
support a broad "class definition" is highly conclusory.70

62. In fact, because the homestead exemption status itself is not ascertained until the time of
the homeowner's death, it may be most appropriate to assess the status of the devisee at that
moment in time (an entitlement approach) rather than beforehand (a class definition approach). Cf.
Wilson v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 64 So. 2d 309, 313 (Fla. 1953).
63. See Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1331 (noting that a testator should be allowed to choose who
within the class of heirs should receive the homestead property and exemption). Proponents of both
approaches point to the intestacy statutes as the source for defining "heirs" for purposes of the
constitutional exemption provision. See supra note 55. However, the Walker court failed to
acknowledge that the cases it cited did not address how to apply the laws regarding intestacy for
this particular purpose.
64. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1004 (citing Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1329).
65. See Bartelt, 579 So. 2d at 283.
66. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
67. See Bartelt,579 So. 2d at 284.
68. See id. at 283.
69. See id.
70. At least one'commentator has asserted that Bartelt stands for an entitlement definition:
"[t]hus, on the basis of Bartelt, creditors would have had rights only against homesteads that were
devised to persons who would not have taken as heirs if no will existed." DAVIDT. SMITH, FLORIDA
PROBATE CODE MANUAL § 4.05, at 32 (1998). Curiously, the instant court quoted the eight
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The instant court also incorporated the Walker court's arguments that
the homestead exemption provision should be liberally construed based on
prior case law, 7 and that constitutional intent supports a "class" definition
' An important basis for the Walker court's conclusions
of "heirs."72
about
constitutional intent was the 1984 amendment to article X, which expanded
the class of persons eligible to benefit from homestead exemption rights.73
The Walker court pointed out that the constitution was silent regarding the
intent of the homestead exemption, but concluded that the amendment
"reflect[s] the intent that the exemption is to inure to whomever the
homestead property passes."74 It is not clear how the court justifies this
proposition,75 for it seems contradictory to the language of the provision
itself.76 Indeed, it is questionable whether the 1984 amendment supports
any generalization about the intended scope of the exemption, beyond the
death of the homeowner.
The instant court offered a sound public policy argument, regarding the
impact that an entitlement definition might have on estate planning
practitioners and their clients.' 1 The class definition should increase the
certainty associated with devising one's homestead property by ensuring
that the homestead property will remain beyond the reach of the estate's
creditors.78 While this result may be desirable, it seems doubtful that the
language and intent of article X, section 4(b) requires the kind of
interpretative analysis undertaken by the majority. 79 The case law relied
upon by the instant court ranges from ambiguous 0 to misguided, 1 and the
court's decision effectively redrafts the constitutional exemption provision

sentences preceding Professor Smith's conclusion, above, in support of its decision regarding the
exemption provision's viability in testate situations, but avoided the conclusion embracing an
entitlement approach. See Snyder 699 So. 2d at 1003.
71. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1004 (quoting Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1330).
72. See id. (quoting Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1330).
73. See Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1330.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. To support its determination of the intent behind the 1984 amendment, the court provides
a footnote reference to an earlier case, Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1969).Aetna
seems simply to highlight the distinction between the inurement of an exemption's protection
against creditors of the decedent, and a subsequent new homestead exemption to protect against
one's own creditors. See LaGasse, 223 So. 2d at 729; see also supra note 12.
76. For instance, a homestead property devised to a close friend would not qualify for
protection against the decedent's creditors under any definition of "heirs." See, e.g., State Dep't of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Trammell, 508 So. 2d 422,424 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

77. See supra text accompanying note 51.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
80. Bartelt,for instance, is factually distinct from the instant case and constitutes only weak
support for a class definition. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
81. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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to read "heirs apparent" or "potential heirs."82 The majority's use of
interpretative license, instead of seeking to change the provision itself,
seems to be a quick-but ultimately dangerous-way to broaden the scope
of the homestead exemption's protection.

82. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
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